Let Britain be Britain
Preserving Britain's independence from
Europe.
Doug Bandow on Britain & Europe on National Review Online
February 3, 2003, 9:30 a.m.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-bandow020303.asp
LONDON, ENGLAND The U.S. has no stronger ally than
Great Britain, and with a Labor government, no less. But future
trans-Atlantic cooperation might hinge on whether or not Britain
joins the euro.
European attitudes towards America have turned chilly of late.
France, a member of the U.N. Security Council, continues to
spar with the U.S. over Iraq. Germany's Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder won reelection by vowing not to cooperate with Washington.
He's maintained his criticism of U.S. policy while working
with Paris to generate a common European strategy.
Through it all Prime Minister Tony Blair has stood with the
Bush administration. But nothing is permanent. The Blair-led
letter of European support last week was an obvious diplomatic
coup for the U.S. But most of its signers will offer little
practical help during either the military campaign or resulting
occupation. Indeed, when the Czech defense minister visited
Kuwait, he offered a ride home to any of the 250 Czech chemical-weapons
specialists who wanted to leave; seven jumped on board his
jet and another score later joined them. Imagine Donald Rumsfeld
doing the same for U.S. soldiers. Italy and Spain are more
serious players, but could easily align with France and Germany
after a change in government
Moreover, opposition to Washington's Iraq policy is rising
even in Britain. Blair dominates the political landscape,
but Margaret Thatcher's fate demonstrates just how fragile
parliamentary control can be. At the same time, shadow boxing
over acceptance of the euro is in full swing. Blair recently
declared: "The euro is not just about our economy, but
our destiny." The coming battle over joining euroland
will pit large versus small business, divide both parties,
and perhaps even affect Labor's succession, since Chancellor
of the Exchequer Gordon Brown so far opposes Britain's entry.
For most Americans the euro is an administrative convenience,
nothing more. Yet, observes George Bridges of Quiller Consultants,
"an American businessman goes from Frankfurt to Madrid
and appreciates the ease of using a common currency without
realizing that he is going from economic basket case to another."
Ironically, an expanded euro may end up encouraging economic
protectionism directed against America and promoting a politically
independent continent.
Continental Europe has never been a bastion of economic freedom.
France was a great mercantilist state; Bismarck's Germany
created the social-insurance state. The European Union and
subsequently the euro helped open some of the most socialized,
least competitive economies.
But the EU and euro also impose a regulatory overlay enforced
by an unelected bureaucracy in Brussels. Unfortunately, writes
British historian Paul Johnson, "European societies have
become a paradise for bureaucrats, trade unionists, centrist
politicians and those businessmen who prefer to work under
government protection." No surprise at the supreme frustration
in Brussels when they occasionally have to go to the voters
of different nations for approval.
Moreover, the euro, which binds together 12 very different
economies, is becoming unhinged at a time of slow growth.
Last year Portugal violated the three-percent deficit ceiling.
France has announced that it will not cut its deficit to meet
euro rules. Explained French Finance Minister Francis Mer:
"We decided that there are other priorities in France."
Germany, the continent's biggest economy, acknowledges that
it has violated the limit; the economic news from Berlin seems
to worsen almost daily.
Italy's Premier Silvio Berlusconi is pushing tax cuts and
spending hikes that will likely push his nation out of compliance.
Other states have relied on accounting tricks to maintain
formal adherence.
Public dissatisfaction also is rising. Many Greeks blame
the euro for sharply rising prices. Two-thirds of Germans
favor abandoning the common currency. The EU's president,
former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, spoke for many
when he stated: "the stability pact is stupid, like all
decisions that are rigid."
Thus, there's good reason for London to hesitate before signing
on. After all, over the last decade Britain's economy has
grown half again as fast as has the Eurozone, and is now zipping
along twice as fast. Britain has lower unemployment and inflation
and higher per capita GDP than does Euroland.
Great Britain also continues to receive more inward investment
than France or Germany, and last year moved from fourth to
second, after America, in total foreign-investment received.
Moreover, the convenience of a common continental currency
is overstated. Britain's trade with Euroland continues to
increase as a percentage of GDP; in fact, in the euro's first
three years Britain's exports to the Eurozone jumped more
than the average rise in intra-zone exports.
Existing EU rules are costly enough. Observes Tory MP Liam
Fox, the shadow minister for health who has formed a new think
tank, the Atlantic Bridge, to promote trans-Atlantic ties:
"Bureaucracy will be the end of us. That is the special
relationship with Europe." American Enterprise Institute
scholar Kevin Hassett calls it a "Red-tape Curtain,"
combining sclerotic regulation and bloated social-welfare
programs.
Joining the Eurozone means even tighter economic controls.
Last year, argued German Chancellor Schroeder, "What
we need is to Europeanize everything to do with economic and
financial policy. In this area we need much more let's
call it co-ordination and co-operation to soothe British feelings
than we had before." After denouncing the rigidity
of Euroland rules, Romano Prodi called for "a single
economic government for all countries who share the same money."
Similarly, claimed the European Commissioner for Economic
and Monetary Affairs, Pedro Solbes: "It is essential
that joining the euro is not seen as an end in itself. The
ultimate objective is full and successful economic integration."
The result would be to encourage European governments to
circle the continental wagons. Complains Fox: "regional
trading blocs were supposed to promote free trade, but in
Europe they are becoming a way to limit free trade."
France's death-defying defense of the Common Agricultural
Policy, which accounts for nearly half of the EU's $95 billion
annual budget, is but one example. Worries John Hulsman of
the Heritage Foundation: "The very institutional structure
of the EU illustrates that the more integrated Europe is,
the more protectionist its leanings become."
American business has a stake in the relative openness of
the British market. The U.S. accounts for about half of all
foreign direct investment in Britain; Americans invest almost
as much in the U.K. as in the rest of Europe.
Although British goods exports are oriented to the Eurozone,
not so services and investments. All told, Britons trade as
much with America as with France and Germany combined. Britain
is the largest single investor in the U.S., while America
returns the favor, putting more money into Britain than Euroland
combined. Argues Liam Fox, "the British economy is more
like that of the U.S. than of Europe." Indeed, "it's
the only European country with more trade outside of Europe
than within it."
Moreover, economic integration has obvious political overtones.
Notes Fox: "Economic centralization is a precursor to
political centralization." Which is the explicit goal
of many Europeans.
For instance, French Foreign Minister Pierre Moscovici observed:
"We don't agree with the Americanization of the world
... we are saying that together we can build a new superpower
... and its name will be Europe." European Commissioner
for Regional Policy, Michael Barnier, pushed the same theme
last year: "The choice is between an independent Europe
and a Europe under American influence."
Even in Britain some critics of Washington want to move closer
to Europe. Former Labor defense minister Peter Kilfoyle complains
that "Britain ends up as America's handrag." Says
Stuart Reid, deputy editor of The Spectator: "I believe
that we Britons have for too long cleaved to the United States
of America and ought now, with good grace, cleave instead
to the United States of Europe."
Some, like Chancellor Schroeder, exhibit bad grace. Indeed,
the late President Francois Mitterand reportedly said: "we
are at war with America." It was, he admitted, "a
war without death," but nevertheless was "a permanent
war, a vital war."
Former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing currently
heads a quasi-convention charged with developing a new EU
constitution. There is even talk of a name change, to United
Europe or the United States of Europe.
The implications for Washington are ominous. Author A. S.
Byatt has written: "Despite the creation of the European
Union, Europeans do not speak with one voice except
when opposing U.S. foreign policy." In contrast, Britain
is far closer to America. For instance, on his recent trip
to the U.S., Foreign Secretary Jack Straw observed: "However
effective Europe becomes as a regional or global actor, we
cannot expect to make a real difference without regular, close
and systematic cooperation with the U.S. in NATO, higher and
more focused defense spending and greater efficiency in Europe's
armed forces."
But the tighter Britain's connection to Europe, and the more
stringent continental controls over British policy, the less
able Britain will be to make its own decisions. Worries Bridges,
an aide to former Prime Minister John Major, "the centrifugal
force of Europe would be hard to resist." For instance,
he worries, "If Great Britain decided it had to fight
a war with the U.S. and wanted to bust its budget caps to
increase military spending, one can imagine the reaction in
Europe." Alex Hickman, with the no campaign, goes further:
"If Great Britain joins the euro, its ability to act
independently will diminish and maybe ultimately even disappear."
Still, it's not enough for the U.S. to urge London to just
say no. "We should use the special relationship [with
America] to build new institutions," argues Fox.
One possibility, suggested by John Hulsman, would be to encourage
Britain to join an expanded North American Free Trade Association.
London could first try to renegotiate the Treaty of Rome,
allowing it to join NAFTA. Failing that, Britain could shift
from the EU to the European Free Trade Area and European Economic
Area (which include Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway), and
then sign up with NAFTA. This, Hulsman argues, provides "the
last real chance for Britain to choose an alternative future
path, one that recognizes that its natural economic and political
partner remains the United States and not the European Union."
Creating a broader free trade association also would offer
other nations an alternative to more statist regional blocs,
such as the EU.
Or, to avoid the political complications of challenging Britain's
place within the EU, the U.S. could unilaterally lower trade
barriers against Britain. That would benefit Americans, even
if the U.K. could not reciprocate, and free London from having
to choose in or out of the EU when deciding on the euro.
Although Washington is the world's strongest power, it will
not be able to forever avoid serious challenge from other
nations and international blocs. A united Europe, though seemingly
a distant prospect in light of the continent's current division
over Iraq, could become a particularly potent adversary. Thus,
the U.S. should discourage development of a centralized, monolithic
Europe arrayed against America. That includes encouraging
Great Britain to remain outside of the Eurozone.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute
http://www.cato.org
and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan.